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[For the attention of the typesetter. Pagehead title: Positively gamma discounting]
The aggregated term structure of social discount rates that results from Weitz-
mans (2001) survey of expert opinion is shown to be highly sensitive to the
nature of the responses. If variation reects irreducible di¤erences in ethical
judgements, the term structure can decline rapidly. If variation occurred because
respondents were forecasting future rates under uncertainty, the term structure
is much atter because additional experts provide new information. The former
approach triples the social cost of carbon when compared to the latter. The dis-
tinction between heterogeneity and uncertainty illustrates the need for a nuanced
treatment of survey data in intergenerational policy making.
The issue of social discounting has long been a major source of disagreement amongst econo-
mists and philosophers, with some perspectives being described as not simply myopic but
ethically indefensible, rapaciousand defective. Such strong sentiments arise from the
fact that the estimated present values of very long-term projects are generally highly sen-
sitive to the choice of discount rates that are deployed. For example, the present value
of £ 1 in 100 years is fty times higher when discounted at 1% than at 5%, and this ratio
increases exponentially with the time horizon. As a consequence, the policy prescriptions
on intergenerational projects are often determined by the rate at which the costs and ben-
ets are discounted. Indeed, some have argued that the immediate and dramatic action
on climate change recommended by the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change
(Stern, 2007) resulted solely from the inappropriately low social discount rate (SDR) that
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was used, a position which evoked accusations of perhaps stoking the dying embers of the
British Empire(Nordhaus, 2007, p.691).
In recent years, however, something resembling a consensus has emerged in the eld of
social discounting. A recent Policy Forum article in Science summarises the case for us-
ing lower rates for discounting long-term costs and benets than their short-term equivalent
counterparts (Arrow et al., 2013). Reviews of the relevant academic literature that supports
this approach have also recently been provided by Gollier (2012) and Arrow et al. (2012).
The UK, French, Norwegian and Danish governments all now recommend schedules of declin-
ing discount rates (DDRs) as the time horizon increases.1 Similar policy recommendations
are currently being considered by the authorities in the US.
In this paper we return to a study that has been highly inuential in shaping the policy
landscape for declining discount rates. Weitzman (2001) sought the opinion of a large number
of economists on the appropriate discount rate that should be used for calculating the present
value of future global warming damages. The responses to the survey were widely dispersed,
with the sample frequency distribution closely resembling the probability density function
of a gamma distribution. When these responses were aggregated according to Professor
Weitzmans preferred method, known as gamma discounting, the resulting SDR schedule
declined sharply.
We focus here on the interpretation of the expert responses and the method by which
they were combined to calculate the social discount rate within gamma discounting. Specif-
ically, the question that Professor Weitzman asked contained a signicant ambiguity. As a
consequence, experts might have interpreted the survey in one of two distinct ways. Our
central point is that the appropriate method of aggregation depends critically on which of
these interpretations each expert had in mind when responding.
Under the rst interpretation, experts might have revealed their individual ethical views
1Within the UK, the Treasury-recommended DDR schedule forms the basis for the economic evaluation
of the High Speed 2 rail link by government. It is also used for capital budgeting purposes by the Nuclear
Decommissioning Authority.
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concerning intergenerational justice. Di¤erences in such subjective opinions are essentially
irreducible. In this case, sampling additional experts only serves to characterise better the
extent of disagreement and does nothing to diminish the variation in responses. This may
reasonably lead the social planner to construct the same schedule of SDRs as reported by
Weitzman (2001).
Under the second interpretation, the variation in survey responses might instead have
reected forecasting errors about some objective truevalue. These responses then reveal the
nature of our uncertainty about the future rather than the extent of heterogeneity in ethical
positions. In this case, increasing the sample of experts provides additional information
to the social planner, improving the quality of the aggregated forecast. We show that this
generates a term structure of SDRs which declines slowly and, in some cases, is essentially
at.
This point has important implications for economic valuations made across a wide range
of key policy areas. We demonstrate this through four examples; the social cost of carbon,
the costs of teenage obesity, nuclear decommissioning costs and the economic benets of the
High Speed 2 (HS2) rail link.
1. The Survey Question
The basis of the gamma discounting framework of Weitzman (2001) was an emailed survey
to PhD-level economists that generated n = 2160 responses, ri for i 2 [1; n], to the question
Taking all relevant considerations into account, what real interest rate do you think should
be used to discount over time the (expected) benets and (expected) costs of projects being
proposed to mitigate the possible e¤ects of global climate change?
The individual responses were widely dispersed with a range from -3% to +27%. The
problem that then faces the social planner is how to aggregate this range of values into
a single social discount rate, R(H); to apply when discounting a certainty-equivalent cash
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ow that will arrive at time H. Without fully explaining his rationale, Weitzman (2001)
proposed taking the simple average of individual discount factors:
exp( HR(H)) = 1
n
nX
i=1
exp ( Hri) (1)
Our analysis centres on equation 1. For now we note that R (H) when dened this way has
the following properties: limH!0R (H) = ri, where ri is the mean of the individual responses,
limH!1R (H) = min frig, and dR(H)=dH < 0. The decline in the term structure occurs
since from todays perspective, the only relevant limiting scenario is the one with the lowest
interest rate  all of the other states at that far distant time, by comparison, are relatively
much less important now because their present value has been reduced by the power of
compound discounting at a higher rate(Weitzman, 1998, p.205).
The reason for the declining discount rate also has a simple mathematical explana-
tion. Exponential functions are convex, so by Jensens inequality n 1
Pn
i=1 exp ( Hri) >
exp ( Hri). The greater H, the more curved the exponential function, explaining why the
appropriate SDR declines with the maturity of the project. Further, the more dispersed
the responses, the greater the magnitude of the Jensens inequality. These points can be
simply demonstrated by example. Suppose that there were only two responses; r1 = 3%
and r2 = 5%: Then R (H) = [4:0%; 3:9%; 3:6%; 3:2%] for H = [1; 30; 100; 400]. By
contrast, if we preserve the mean but increase the spread of the responses by setting r1 = 1%
and r2 = 7%, R (H) = [4:0%; 2:8%; 1:7%; 1:2%] for the same values of H.
Rather than applying equation 1 directly, Weitzman (2001) took the following elegant
analytical approximation. He noticed that the sample frequency of responses,  (ri), closely
resembled the probability density function of a gamma distribution with shape parameter
 and rate parameter . Using this continuous distribution to describe the individual
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responses, from equation 1:
R (H) =   1
H
ln
Z 1
0
e Hr

  ()
r 1e rdr

=   
H
ln


 +H

(2)
thus giving a simple closed-form solution for the H period discount rate.
To determine the term structure of the SDR that arises from gamma discounting, we
estimate ;  using a maximum likelihood method based on the strictly positive responses
that Professor Weitzman received, giving b = 2:54 and b = 63:08. This results in a sharply
declining term structure of social discount rates; R(H) = 4:00%; 3:29%, 2:41% and 1:27%
for H = [1; 30; 100; 400] years respectively.
We now consider how experts might have interpreted the survey question that Professor
Weitzman posed. The most prominent distinction here, as highlighted by Arrow et al.
(1996), is between those who view long-term discounting as a fundamentally ethical issue,
(e.g. Stern, 2008), and others who prefer to calibrate the SDR to reect market and policy
factors as they currently exist(Nordhaus, 2007, p 692). Respectively, these are commonly
referred to as normative and positive (or prescriptive and descriptive) positions on social
discounting. This dichotomy was central to the controversial aftermath of the Stern Review
as the low ethically derived rates applied by Stern prescribe a more urgent response to climate
change than many markets-based discount rate schedules (e.g. Nordhaus, 2007; Stern, 2008).
Our contention in this paper is that the wording of the survey leaves su¢ cient scope to
be interpreted within either of these paradigms.2 The use of the term interest ratepoints
towards a positivist framework. Alternatively, it seems equally likely that the reference to
climate change may have evoked ethical considerations, leading to normative responses.
We do not take a stance on which was the appropriate reading of the survey question.
2There are, of course, a range of other possible interpretations between these two extremes. The sup-
plementary wording of the survey included such terms as gut feeling, back-of-the-envelope guesstimate
and o¤ the top of your head, making it clear that a variety of rationales could have underpinned any given
experts response. Additionally, the sample may mix some purely normative responses with others that
were purely positive. We dichotomize the debate for reasons of simplicity and clarity and note that this
distinction is well understood in the literature.
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Instead, we demonstrate that the term structure of SDRs that emerges from this survey
depends crucially on whether the exercise elicited ethical responses reecting heterogeneity,
or market-based responses reecting uncertainty.
2. Ethical Responses
Assume rst that each expert took an ethical position concerning intergenerational justice
when determining his or her response. Combining these heterogeneous preferences is es-
sentially a social choice problem for which there is no uncontentious solution and not all
approaches lead to a declining social discount rate. For instance, Heal (2012) reminds us
that the median value will be the outcome of a number of plausible social choice rules,
including majority voting.
That said, a number of di¤erent theoretical frameworks exist that might provide justi-
cation for the use of equation 1 when determining the social discount rate in a normative
context. We briey note one example here and engage in a fuller discussion of this point in
our online Appendix A.
Following Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005), Jouini et al. (2010) imagine a pure exchange
economy with di¤erent agents who all have logarithmic utility. These individuals di¤er
in three respects: their beliefs about future consumption growth, their initial endowment
levels, wi; and their rates of pure time preference (utility discount rate), i > 0. Acting
atomistically, each agent would choose a di¤erent path of consumption, so disagreement arises
over how to share the exogenous consumption stream. Within the framework proposed by
Jouini et al. (2010) the agents are experts who disagree on consumption growth and i. The
social planner resolves this disagreement by invoking an as-ifmarket between the experts.
The resulting intertemporal Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, and hence socially e¢ cient, discount
rate is given by:
R(H) =   1
H
ln
 
nX
i=1
wiiPn
j=1wjj
exp f Hrig
!
(3)
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Equation 1 follows from here provided that wii is constant across experts. The e¢ cient
term structure is declining since intertemporal trade between experts leads those with a high
utility discount rate to prefer paths with more consumption early on, leaving experts with
low i as the chief determinants of the long-run discount rate.
This framework neatly captures the idea that variation in ethical judgements reects
fundamental and irreducible disagreements. This follows by virtue of R (H) being indepen-
dent of the number of experts surveyed, n, above the minimum threshold required for the
sample to be representative of the population. Therefore, with ethical responses, gamma
discounting can be theoretically defended, although its usage remains contentious.
3. The Positivist Interpretation
Suppose instead that the survey responses resulted from within a purely positivist framework,
where experts were requested to look carefully at the returns on alternative investments 
at the real real interest rate as the benchmarks for climatic investments(Nordhaus, 2007,
p 692). In this setting, the standard model for determining the term structure of social
discount rates, which has been highly inuential in determining international governmental
policy in this area, is the expected net present value (ENPV) condition:
R (H) =   1
H
ln (E fexp [ HrH ]g) (4)
where rH = H 1
PH 1
t=0 rft and rft is the yield on a Treasury bond at time t. rH can
be interpreted as the average future risk-free rate over the horizon of interest. Empirical
schedules of the SDRs using equation 4 have been provided by Newell and Pizer (2003),
Groom et al. (2007) and Freeman et al. (2013) amongst others.3
3The theoretical case for using ENPVs within environmental economics was presented byWeitzman (1998)
and subsequently discussed in detail by Traeger (2012), Gollier and Weitzman (2010), Freeman (2010) and
Gollier (2009), amongst others. In our online Appendix B we note that equation 4 also has a long tradition
in nancial economics. In particular, the Local Expectations Hypothesis of Cox et al. (1981) is equivalent
to the ENPV condition but the underlying assumptions concerning the stochastic nature of rH and the
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Within this setting, the most natural interpretation of each individuals survey response is
that it reects his or her own personal estimate of the future realised value of rH ; ri = Ei [rH ].
This is fundamentally di¤erent from the information content of a survey eliciting ethical
opinions; ri is now a forecast of rH . Variations in response arise from asymmetric information
or di¤erences in professional judgement over how best this forecasting process might be
undertaken. These di¤erent choices do not reect fundamentally di¤erent ethical stances
and are not irreducible in this sense. At time H   1 the true value of rH will be revealed
and, with the benet of hindsight, we will all agree on which respondents gave the most
accurate forecast.
The social planner must now decide how to combine these di¤erent forecasts. The
simplest method is to take a statistical approach. Let ei = ri  rH denote the forecast error
of expert i. First assume that all experts are unbiased, E[ei] = 0, that the forecast error
variance of each is identical, V ar[ei] = 2, and that experts are independent. As Weitzman
provides us with such a large sample, irrespective of the sample frequency distribution,
 (ri), under weak regularity conditions the central limit theorem tells us that the probability
density function of rH , f (rH) = N(ri; 2=n). The H period discount rate from equation
4 is now:
R(H) = ri   0:52H
n
(5)
In contrast to equation 1, the appropriate measure of uncertainty is the standard error,
not the standard deviation, of the sample distribution. More experts provide additional
information to the social planner. This reduces her uncertainty over the truevalue of rH ,
which in turn lessens the Jensens inequality e¤ects that drive declining schedules of social
discount rates.
Of course, expert opinions are not independent; see, for example, Clemen and Winkler
(1985) and Graham (1996). To account for this correlation, we generalise the statistical
resolution of uncertainty are much less stylised than in the original thought experiment of Weitzman (1998).
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approach by turning to the substantial literature on combining probability distributions (e.g.
Genest and Zidek, 1986). To capture the fact that each additional expert now brings less
fresh information than the previous one, we follow Clemen and Winkler (1985) by mapping
the total number surveyed, n, onto N; the e¤ective number of independent experts. We
discuss in detail in our online Appendix C how this relatively technical exercise can be
undertaken and how this then inuences the social planners probability density function of
rH , f (rH) ; for use in equation 4.
Unfortunately, Weitzmans survey does not ask experts how they arrived at their re-
sponses, and therefore it is not possible to empirically estimate the correlation between
di¤erent expert forecasts. We therefore take a range of possible values; N 2 f1000; 100; 50;
25; 12g.4 For the nal case, this means that the information content of Weitzmans survey
of 2,000+ economists is the same as could be found in a sample of 12 truly independent
experts. The derived term structures of social discount rates are presented in Figure 1:
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
These results di¤er markedly from those reported by Weitzman (2001). The 400-year
(30-year) discount rate is only 32% (82%) of the short-term rate under gamma discounting,
but this increases to 72% (97%) when placing a positivist interpretation on the survey with
N = 12. Increasing N to 1000 leads to a term structure that is essentially at. This
reects the fact that, with more information, forecast errors are reducible in a way that
ethical opinions are not.
4We concentrate on exponentially correlated forecasts, which have been used in the context of gamma
distributions by Kotz and Adams (1964). Forecasts are ranked in ascending order and the correlation
between the ith and jth expert is assumed to be ji jj for constant . The cases N 2 f1000; 100; 50; 25; 12g
correspond to  2 f35.71%, 90.95%, 95.37%, 97.66%, 98.87%g. See online Appendix C for further details.
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4. Applications
To demonstrate the importance of this point for decision making across a range of key policy
areas, we consider four examples of long-term cash ows. First, we use the prole of damages
from Newell and Pizer (2003) associated with each marginal ton of carbon emitted in order
to estimate the social cost of carbon (SCC). Next, we take the schedule of estimated costs
from decommissioning 19 now non-operational nuclear power stations in the UK as given
in the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) Report and Accounts 2012/13. Third,
we use estimates from Wang et al. (2003) of the incremental costs that arise for a woman
between the ages of 4165 conditional on her being obese at the age of 14. Finally, we use
o¢ cial estimates of the benets that are expected to arise between 20262085 from Phase
1 (London to Birmingham) of the HS2 rail link. A detailed description of each of these
schedules of cash ows is given in our online Appendix D and their prole is illustrated in
Figure 2:
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
We estimate present values for each of these examples using all of the term structures of
the SDR presented in Figure 1. We also use the schedule recommended by the Green Book
(UK Treasury, 2003) as well as a non-declining 4% rate (which is very close to ri). Results
are reported in Table 1:
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The policy decisions taken by the social planner will often be signicantly inuenced by
the schedule of discount rates selected. The greatest sensitivities are for the longest horizon
cash ows, as reected by the social cost of carbon. Here gamma discounting gives a present
value (PV) that is three times as great as the N = 12 case. For both HS2 and teenage
obesity, the gamma discounting PV is more than half as much again as the N = 12 PV. The
PV of decommissioning costs for the previous generation of nuclear power stations is most
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robust to di¤erent possible choices. However, if these cash ows are delayed by 50 years,
to broadly capture the costs of decommissioning the next generation of power stations, the
present value estimated from gamma discounting is 175% greater than the PV calculated
from the N = 12 case. By contrast, in no case does the N = 12 PV di¤er by more than 10%
from that calculated using a non-declining discount rate of 4% at all horizons. For larger
N , the results become even closer to the non-declining discount rate values.
5. Conclusion
We have shown that the term structure of discount rates that results from Weitzmans
(2001) survey is highly dependent on whether the responses reect forecasts of future risk-
free interest rates or the ethics of intergenerational equity. In the former case, very long-term
present value calculations barely di¤er from those calculated using a at term structure. In
the latter case, the term structure can decline rapidly. We have demonstrated that this has
important implications across a wide range of policy areas for those making decisions with
intergenerational consequences.
In our online Appendix E we make a further point. Even in a purely normative world,
standard approaches potentially exaggerate the decline. This is because such responses
frequently contain ex-post veriable elements, such as the growth rate of per-capita con-
sumption. A mixed normative-positivist approach is therefore recommended in this case,
which again attens the term structure.
Gamma discounting has been highly inuential in shaping the international policy land-
scape on declining discount rates. This paper shows that closer scrutiny on both the motives
behind individual responses and the empirics of aggregation is required before any further
policy changes can be justied on the basis of such surveys of expert opinion.
Loughborough University
London School of Economics
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Table 1
The Present Value of Intergenerational Projects
SCC Current Delayed Teenage HS2
($/tC) NDA (£ bn) NDA (£ bn) Obesity ($) Benets (£ bn)
N=1000 5.692 39.06 5.27 14,753 13.91
N=100 5.738 39.08 5.32 14,780 13.95
N=50 5.706 38.93 5.28 14,660 13.84
N=25 5.543 38.42 5.10 14,238 13.46
N=12 5.346 37.56 4.88 13,560 12.86
Gamma 15.928 44.97 13.41 20,767 21.01
Green Book 10.154 43.84 9.57 19,181 18.68
Flat 4% 5.713 39.11 5.29 14,796 13.95
Notes: This table presents net present values for ve di¤erent cost schedules. SCCis the
social cost of carbon in $2000 per ton of carbon. Current NDAcosts are taken from the
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority annual report and accounts 2012/13. The Delayed
NDA costs are the same as those for current decommissioning, but delayed by 50 years
to reect the process of running down a new generation of nuclear power plants. Teenage
Obesity costs monetise the estimated impacts that are realised between ages 41 and 65 from
being obese at the age of 14. These values are based upon the calibration of Wang et. al.
(2003). The HS2 Benets are taken from the estimates of Net Transport Benets provided
at the hs2.org.uk website. N denotes the equivalent number of independent observers,
Gammarefers to the gamma discounting schedule provided by Weitzman (2001). Green
Bookapplies the UK Treasurys current recommended schedule of discount rates. Flat
4%applies a non-declining discount rate of 4% at all horizons.
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